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Has Administrative Law Finally Arrived in Oklahoma?
MICHAEL P. COX*

At least twice in the past decade, questions have been raised about the extent to which administrative law is being practiced and litigated in
Oklahoma. 1 Since these observations were made, a number of developments
have occurred that may signal a change is under way. For example, the
Oklahoma Bar Association has created an Administrative Law Section, 2 interest has been shown by the Oklahoma legislature in revising Oklahoma's
Administrative Procedures Act (APA),3 and a number of significant ad-4
ministrative law cases have been decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
This commentary focuses on one of these supreme court decisions:
Oklahoma Water Resources Board v. Texas County Irrigation & Water
Resources Association (Texas County).5
The Texas County decision is particularly noteworthy because the
Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized, and forcefully applied, a basic administrative law principle to the Water Resources Board. The case involved
the legality of the issuance of a permit to use fresh ground water for tertiary
recovery of oil and gas. 6 The court remanded the case to the Water Resources
Board wvith several instructions, one of which was: "Further, the Board

* B S., 1965, J.D., 1968, University of Kentucky; LL.M., 1974, J.S.D., 1981, Columbia
University. Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law.-Ed.
1. See, e.g., Cox, The Oklahoma Administrative ProceduresAct: An Aid or a Hindrance?,
37 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 2, 6, 7 (1984); Cox, The Oklahoma Administrative ProceduresAct: Fifteen
Years of Interpretation, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 886, 913 (1978).
2. See 57 OKLA. B.J. 271 (Feb. 1, 1986) (Report of Jan. 17, 1986, action of the Board of
Governors).
3. See, e.g., H.R. 1493, 41st Okla. Legis., 1st Sess. (1987) (passed by Oklahoma House
of Representatives on June 22, 1987, and by Oklahoma Senate on June 23, 1987. Enrolled and
sent to Governor on June 25, 1987); S. 325, 39th Okla. Legis., 1st Sess. SEN. J. 339-40 (1983)
(passed by Oklahoma Senate on Mar. 10, 1983, but not voted on by the House of Representatives). The Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act is found at 75 OKLA. STAT. §§ 301-326
(1981 & Supp. 1986).
4. See, e.g., Willbourn v. City of Tulsa, 721 P.2d 803 (Okla. 1986) (failure to comply with
Torts Claims Act versus § 1983 action); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Grand River Dam Auth.,
720 P.2d 713 (Okla. 1986) (failure to stay agency decision pending judicial review); Oral Roberts
Univ. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 714 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1986) (agency change of interpretation
of statute); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. State, 712 P.2d 40 (Okla. 1985) (standing); Oklahoma
Water Resources Bd. v. Texas County Irrig. & Water Resources Asoc., 711 P.2d 38 (Okla.
1985); Burdick v. Independent School Dist. 52, 702 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1985) (estoppel applied). See
also Turner v. City of Lawton, 57 OKLA. B.J. 1904 (Aug. 2, 1986) (illegally seized evidence not
admissible in administrative hearing), however, mandate not issued pending resolution of Petition for Rehearing.
5. 711 P.2d 38 (Okla. 1985).
6. For an explanation of the differences between primary, secondary, and tertiary recovery,
see id. at 49 n.2 (opinion of Special Justice Robinson).
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before issuing permits for use of fresh ground water for tertiary recovery
should do so only with the benefit of rules and regulations tailored to focus
' 7
inquiry upon the pertinent issues peculiar to the tertiary process.
This directive is at first puzzling because nowhere else did Justice Wilson
indicate in her majority opinion that the Board lacked substantive rules$
relating to issuance of permits for tertiary recovery. Justice Kauger in her
concurring opinion, however, clearly indicated the nature of the deficiency
ordered by the court to be corrected:
At the time of the hearing, no rules existed on the subject of the
rights of the parties or the procedures to be followed before the
Board regarding tertiary oil recovery. . . . The agency has no
authority to conduct hearings until proposed rules have been promulgated in accordance with the [Oklahoma Administrative Procedures] Act .... Substantive rules must be published to avoid
the inherently arbitrary nature of published ad hoc determinations. An unpublished substantive regulation cannot be given legal
effect by the courts. The rationale for requiring administrative
rule making is to protect both the public interest and the rights of
the parties.... Because no rules had been adopted by the Board,
it had no authority to conduct a hearing, to take evidence, to
make findings of fact, or to issue temporary permits to mine fresh
ground water for use in tertiary oil recovery.9
Justice Kauger's characterization of the issues in Texas County is especially
important because without her vote, only three justices concurred in Justice
Wilson's opinion; Justice Kauger is the fifth vote for the five-justice majority. Although the remaining four justices concurred in part and dissented in
part, they dissented on the issue of whether the Board had adequate rules.' 0
The minority opinion, written by Special Justice Robinson (sitting for Vice
Chief Justice Simms), reveals that perhaps the import of Justice Kauger's
concurrence was not fully understood. Justice Robinson states that the Board
had "adequate procedural rules concerning the use of fresh water for
enhanced oil recovery (both secondary and tertiary)."" Justice Kauger,
however, was not merely addressing the absence of "procedural" rules but
also the lack of "substantive" rules. That the court's remand was aimed at
the absence of "substantive" rules is reinforced by the language used by
Justice Wilson in her majority opinion, i.e., the Board was directed to promulgate rules that would "focus inquiry upon the pertinent issues peculiar to
' 12
the tertiary process.'
7. Id. at 47.
8. For a discussion of substantive rules and why they are necessary, see infra notes 13-22
and accompanying text.
9. 711 P.2d at 57, 58, 59 (emphasis in original text).
10. Id. at 54.
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 47.
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For those not familiar with administrative law, clarification of the role of
procedural and substantive rules in the administrative process may assist in
understanding the importance of Texas County. Procedural rules provide the
process that must be followed by an agency (as well as by those who appear
before it) and enable the agency to resolve the substantive issues presented to
it for decision.3 Agency-promulgated, procedural rules are necessary because
the APA only provides broad, general procedures of agency practice. Each
agency must fill in, consistent with constitutional and statutory dictates, any
procedural gaps not covered by the APA.
'
Substantive rules (also referred to as legislative rules" ) are used by agencies, along with constitutional, statutory, and judicial mandates, as the bases
to decide the substantive issues presented for resolution. As one court explained, in "administrative proceedings involving a substantive rule, the
issues are whether the adjudicated facts conform to the rule and whether the
rule should be waived or applied in that particular instance."" Use by an
agency of substantive factors, standards, or guidelines that have not been
produced through statutorily mandated rule-making procedures can be
6
analogized to a court deciding a case with "unenacted legislation."'
Substantive rules are the administrative equivalent of statutes,' and each is
created by its own process. Statutes are the result of the legislative process;
rules are the product of rule making.
The importance of properly promulgated and published substantive rules
in the administrative process cannot be emphasized enough. They are essential in assuring that agency decisions are made in accordance with the rule of
law, i.e., that "adjudicated cases be decided on the basis of general principles
and standards known to the parties and applicable to all cases."'18
Rarely do administrative agencies admit (and, in some instances, perhaps

13. 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 173 (1965), characterizes "procedural rules"
as "describing the methods by which the agency will carry out its appointed functions-rules
which make provisions for the filing of applications, the institution of complaints, the serving of
papers, the conduct of hearings, and the like."
14. 2 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7:8 (2d ed. 1979).
15. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
16. Although courts do announce new policy in judicial decisions, administrative agencies
have less reason to do so because agencies, unlike courts, have power to promulgate substantive
rules. See A. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKINO § 4.1.1 (1986); 1 F. COOPER, supra
note 13, at 177-85. See also S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) ("Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to make new law prospectively through the exercise
of its rule making powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new
standards of conduct.")
17. For a discussion of substantive rules, see 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 14, § 7:8, at 36 ("Valid
legislative [i.e., substantive] rules have about the same effect as valid statutes."); I F. COOPER,
supra note 13, at 175-76; L. MODJESKA, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1.8,
at 14 (1982) ("Substantive rules are analogous to, and have the force and effect of, statutes.");
B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.6, at 158 (2d ed. 1984) ("A substantive rule ...is one
'affecting individual rights and obligations'; it is the administrative equivalent of a statute, compelling compliance with its terms on the part of those within the agency.").
18. 1 F. COOPER, supra note 13, at 43.
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even reaize) that they are making substantive decisions without having
adopted substantive rules according to the requirements of the APA. An
agency may "focus" its inquiry on the "pertinent issues" without understanding that a factor, standard, or guideline it is using as a basis to decide
an issue may, in fact, be within the definition of a rule as defined by the
APA, i.e.: "[A]ny agency statement of general applicability and future effect
that implements, interprets or prescribes substantive law or policy, or
prescribes the procedure or practice requirement of the agency." 19
This definition describes at least two types of rules: substantive
("statements of general applicability and effect ' 20 ) and procedural ("procedure or practice requirements"). In the past the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has clearly stated that an agency may not proceed to decide a case substantively until it has promulgated procedural rules. " Not until Texas County did
the court make such a strong statement regarding the requirement for APA
promulgated, substantive rules prior to agencies acting substantively.
Why should substantive rules, these administrative counterparts to
statutes, be formulated through rule making? Or put another way, what
benefits are lost to the public if rule making does not occur? A concise
answer has been given by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia:
The general policy of [rule making] is to provide for public notice
and comment procedures before the issuance of a rule. This public
participation assures that the agency will have before it the facts
and information relevant to a particular administrative problem,
as well as suggestions for alternative solutions. Public rulemaking
procedures increase the likelihood of administrative responsiveness to the needs and concerns of those affected. And the procedure for public participation tends to promote acquiescence in
22
the result even when objection remains as to substance.
No implication is intended that Oklahoma administrative agencies are intentionally failing to conduct substantive rule making prior to deciding individual cases. However, as Professor Arthur Bonfield of the University of
Iowa Law School, the nation's foremost expert on state administrative rule
making, has observed: "Experience has shown an inclination 'by some agen19. 75 OxiA. STAT. § 301 (2) (Supp. 1986).
20. In administrative law, a distinction is also made between interpretative and substantive
rules. See A. BONFIELD, supranote 16, § 6.9.1, at 280 n.1, and the authorities cited therein; 2 K.
DAVIS, supra noe 14, §§ 7:8-7:15. The definition of "rule" in the Oklahoma APA, 75 OKLA.
STAT. § 301(2) (Supp. 1986), does not make this distinction. As a consequence, both substantive
and interpretative rules in Oklahoma are subject to APA rule-making requirements. The 1961
Model State APA, from which Oklahoma took its definition of "rule" verbatim, and "most
APAs do not contain an exemption from usual rule-making procedures for interpretative rules."
A. BONFIELD, supra note 16, § 6.9.2, at 283. The distinction between substantive and interpretative rules, therefore, is not relevant to the issues discussed in this commentary.
21. See Adams v. Professional Practices Comm'n, 524 P.2d 932, 935 (Okla. 1974); Cox, The
Oklahoma AdministrativeProceduresAct, Fifteen Years of Interpretation,supra note 1,at 891.
22. Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. F.S.L.I.C., 589 F.2d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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cies to label as 'bulletins,' 'announcements,' 'guides,' 'interpretative
bulletins,' and the like, announcements which, in legal operation and effect,
really amount to rules'."123 What is being suggested is that, prior to Texas
County, many Oklahoma agencies may not have understood (and perhaps
still do not understand) the full extent of the APA's substantive rule-making
requirement.
Without regard to whether agency deficiencies in substantive rule making
are unintended or otherwise, the message of Texas County seems clear: The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has put the state's administrative agencies on
notice that, as a general principle, before they may proceed to decide
substantive issues, not only do they have to adopt procedural rules, they also
have to use rule making to develop, promulgate, and publish substantive
rules. Prior to resolving substantive issues, agencies must generally 24 utilize
statutorily mandated, rule-making procedures to inform the public in
general, and affected individuals in particular, as to what factors, standards,
guidelines, and the like will be used to resolve the substantive issues under
consideration.
Texas County may have been precipitated because of the importance of the
matter at hand. The use of fresh ground water (whether for agriculture, for
oil and gas extraction, or for whatever) is an issue of great importance to the
state. As a consequence, the justices may have felt that the factors, standards, or guidelines governing the allocation of this resource simply may not
be developed outside the context of rule making.25 One hopes, however, that
the Texas County requirement of substantive rule making will not be limited to
environmental, conservational, and similar-type issues, but will be applied to
all subjects of administrative competence and inquiry.
Although the long-range consequences of what substantive principles
govern the use of fresh ground water are critical to Oklahoma, application of
the Texas County rationale to other agency responsibilities is likewise essential if the public is to be well-served by its administrative process. Because of
Texas County, one can reasonably conclude that administrative law is, in
fact, finally beginning to arrive in Oklahoma.

23. A. BONFmLD, supra note 16, § 3.3.1, at 74.
24. Instances will arise, of course, where circumstances will not permit the use of all APA
rule-making provisions. For example, the APA, as well as other statutes dealing with agency rule

making; permit a relaxation of statutory requirements in emergency situations. See, e.g., 75
OKLA.

STAT.

§§ 253, 303(B) (1981 & Supp. 1986). Those Oklahoma agencies not subject to the

APA (See, e.g., 75 OK.A.

STAT.

§§ 301, 324 (Supp. 1986)) nevertheless remain obligated to con-

duct substantive rule making under the Texas County rationale even though that case involved

the Water Resources Board, an APA agency. The requirement for substantive rules is basic to
administrative law and does not depend on whether an agency is or is not subject to the APA.
See supra notes 17 and 20.

25. See, e.g., Texas County, 711 P.2d 38, 56 (Kauger, J.): "I can think of no commodity
which affects and concerns the citizens of this state more than fresh groundwater."
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